

Guidance for Protecting Building Environments From Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks

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
Engineering and Physical Hazards Branch



A Merging of Missions

NIOSH Building
Vulnerability Evaluations

OHS Building Air
Protection Workgroup



Document History

- Building Vulnerability Evaluations
 - NIOSH Activity (ongoing)
 - 59 buildings (Nov '01 – Apr '02)
 - 15 NIOSH engineers & scientists
 - 1 Scientist from Sandia National Lab
 - 1 Industrial Hygienist from ATSDR
 - Vulnerabilities identified, recommendations provided to reduce vulnerabilities
 - Reports held confidential

Document History

Office of Homeland Security: Building Air Protection Workgroup

- 1st Convened in Jan '02
- Purpose: Identify guidance on building protection issues associated with an airborne CBR attack
- Membership...

Building Air Protection Workgroup

- White House Office of Homeland Security (WG Chair)
- Dept. Of Defense (DARPA, DTRA, NAVFAC, SBCCOM, USACE)
- Dept. of Energy (DOE, LBNL)
- Dept. of Health and Human Services (CDC/NIOSH)
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
- U.S. General Services Administration
- Dept. of Commerce (NIST)
- Dept. of State
- U.S. Postal Service



Document Scope

- Building Air Protection from terrorist release of airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological contaminant
- Provides hierarchy of reasonable recommendations implementable w/o undue delay
- Primarily directed to building owners, managers, facilities personnel

Scope (continued)

- Covers Public, Private, Government Buildings.
 - Office
 - Retail
 - Hospitals
 - Public Venues
 - Transportation Terminals
 - Schools
- Does not cover:
 - Military or Law Enforcement Facilities
 - Subways
 - Single-family or Low Occupancy Housing
 - Industrial Facilities

Get Prepared: Know Your Building

- Understand how building systems were designed and currently function.
- Encourages a detailed building walkthrough:
 - Does installation resemble your design info.?
 - Building zoning, AHU locations, smoke control?
 - Mechanical condition of equipment?
 - Equipment appropriately installed/connected?
 - Filtration systems (type, efficiency, installation)?
 - Damper cond. & location (OA, RA, bypass, fire/smoke)
 - HVAC control systems, including fire response
 - Building access points, current security practices
 -

Recommendations

- Non-mandatory
- Implementation Based Upon Building Security Assessments
- Recognized, not all recommendations applicable/feasible to all buildings
- Four Categories of recommendations
- Recommendations prioritized within category
- Highly Critical items annotated with “***” in the document

Recommendation Categories

1. Things Not To Do
2. Physical Security
3. Ventilation & Filtration
4. Maintenance, Administration & Training

Things Not To Do


- Do not permanently seal outdoor air intakes.
- Do not modify HVAC systems (includes filter upgrades) without understanding the effects on building systems or occupants.
- Do not interfere with fire protection and life safety systems.

Physical Security

1. Prevent access to outdoor air intakes.
 - Relocate outdoor air intakes to inaccessible areas.
 - Build extensions to protect vulnerable intakes.
 - 12' minimum
 - sloped metal mesh inlet
 - Security Zones: Place intake areas off-limits.
 - Enforce with guards, CCTV, proximity sensors


Secure Vulnerable Air Intakes

Protecting Outdoor Air Intakes






Relocation

Relocate OA intake to
a high sidewall or
secure roof




Build Intake Extensions



Extension Design Recommendations

- Lowest edge as high as poss. (≥ 12 ft.)
- Sloped inlet (min. 45 deg. recommended)
- Metal mesh protecting inlet



Security Zones

Third choice in recommended security techniques for OA intakes (may be most feasible for some)

- Goal to keep public away from intake
- Iron fencing or similar see-through barriers preferred
- Open buffer zones to help make intrusion more obvious
- Enhance with physical security, CCTV, security lighting, intrusion alarms to increase security

Physical Security

2. Restrict access to mechanical areas and roofs
 - Mechanical areas located throughout building
 - Provide access to centralized mechanical systems (HVAC, elevator, water, etc.)
 - Unauthorized roof access can lead to building ingress and/or access to roof-mounted mechanical equipment
 - Mechanical systems are susceptible to tampering & contamination
 - Access to these areas should be strictly controlled, maintain log and accountability for keys, key codes, access cards etc.

Physical Security

3. Non- “***” items

- Increased security, guards, alarms, CCTV, fencing
- Isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, storage
- Secure return air grills (in public buildings)
- Escorted or pre-approved maintenance contractors for sensitive areas
- Restrict access to building information (design, operations, emergency plans, ...)

Ventilation & Filtration

1. Evaluate HVAC control options (building specific)
 - System shutdown
 - Zone pressurization
 - Air Purge (e.g. 100% OA if internal release)
 - Specialized exhaust for some areas
 - Pressurized egress routes (may already exist)
 - Procedures & training incorporated into building's emergency response plan

Ventilation & Filtration

2. Assess Filtration

- Intentionally not “Increase Filtration”.
- Seek highest filtration efficiency compatible with HVAC system capabilities and design requirements.
- Installation integrity potentially more important than rated efficiency.
- Efficiency increase must apply to both size and physical state of contaminant to be effective.
(e.g. Particulate filters vs chemical gas attack)
- Know benefits & limitations of selected upgrades.

Ventilation & Filtration

Non- “***” items:

- Ducted and non-ducted return air systems
- Low-leakage, fast-acting dampers
- Building air tightness

Maintenance, Administration and Training

1. Emergency Response Plans, Policies, Procedures
 - All buildings should have current emergency plans
 - Incorporate CBR scenarios into plans
 - Coordinate with local emergency response personnel
 - Train & Rehearse
 - Limit distribution of plan details
 - Detail Communication Capabilities
 - Upgrade as necessary
 - Will likely need specific instructions for CBR event

Maintenance, Administration and Training

2. HVAC maintenance staff training
 - System upgrades will require new training.

3. Preventive maintenance and procedures
 - Maintenance is critical to keep protective systems operational.
 - Regularly test strategic equipment

Conclusions

- Reducing vulnerability to CBR attack requires comprehensive approach.
- Protective measures should be based on threat profile and risk assessment (See references).
- Preventing access to vulnerable areas is critical.
- Recommendations will not eliminate risk, should reduce the likelihood and impact of a CBR attack.

Acknowledgements

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INVENTION TOONS

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Guidelines Availability

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